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The following day Abu
Bakr set out from Madinah with a long string of pack camels, for
the riding camels had all gone with Usama and these inferior camels
were the best that Abu Bakr could muster in the way of
transportation. As the convoy got to the abandoned apostate camp,
the Muslims who had driven the apostates away mounted these camels
and the force advanced towards Zhu Hussa-the apostate base.
Here the enemy waited, and Hibal, the
brother of Tulaiha, showed his military cunning. He kept his men
behind the crest of a slope, some distance ahead of the base
towards which the Muslims were advancing.
The Muslims, mounted on their pack
camels, rode up the slope unaware of the enemy who waited just
beyond the crest. When the unsuspecting Muslims got near the crest,
the apostates stood up and hurled upon the forward slope a
countless number of goatskins filled with water. As these goatskins
rolled down the crest towards the Muslims, a wild din arose from
the apostate ranks as they hammered on drums and screamed at the
top of their voices. The pack camels, untrained for battle and not
used to sudden loud noises or the sight of unfamiliar objects
rolling towards them in large numbers, turned and bolted. The
Muslims did their utmost to control their panic-stricken mounts but
failed, and very soon the entire Muslim force was home
again!
Hibal had reason to feel pleased with
himself. He had pulled a fast one on the Muslims and driven them
back to Madinah without, so to speak, firing a shot. In view of
this clever trick which Hibal pulled off, it is possible that the
preceding apostate withdrawal had been a feint, planned by Hibal,
to draw the Muslims out of the security of their town towards Zhu
Hussa. We do not know. But Hibal now made the mistake of assuming
that the Muslims were frightened, and that their hasty move back to
Madinah was a sign of weakness. He did not know that the Muslims
were mounted on pack camels, and that it was these animals that had
panicked and not the men who rode them. The part of his force that
had remained at Zhu Qissa was informed of this success and called
forward. The same evening the full force of the apostates advanced
and re?established the camp near Madinah, from which they had
withdrawn only the day before. The spirits of the apostates were
high.
The Muslims, on the other hand, were very
angry, and every man was determined to set the record straight in a
return engagement. Abu Bakr knew that the apostates had returned to
their camp near Madinah, and decided to assail them before they
could complete their preparations for battle. Under his
instructions, the Muslims spent most of the night reorganising
their small army and preparing for battle.
During the latter part of the night Abu
Bakr led his army out of Madinah and formed up for the assault. He
deployed the army with a centre, two wings and a rear guard.
Keeping the centre under his direct command, he placed the right
wing under Numan, the left wing under Abdullah and the rearguard
under Suwaid-all three of whom were sons of Muqaran. Before dawn
the army was set in motion towards the enemy camp where the
apostates, confident of an easy victory on the morrow, slept
soundly.
This time it was Hibal who was surprised.
The first glow of dawn had not yet appeared when a furious,
screaming mass of Muslims fell upon the camp with drawn swords. The
apostates did not stand upon the order of their going. Many were
killed, but most of them found safety in flight, and did not stop
until they had got to Zhu Qissa, where they paused to rest and
reorganise. Their spirits were no longer so high.
This round had been won by Abu Bakr, and
his was no empty success. It was a bloody tactical action in which
the enemy had been driven back by the sword and not by deception
alone. Abu Bakr had decided to catch the enemy unawares and thus
get the benefit of surprise to offset his numerical inferiority,
and in this he had succeeded. He needed quick tactical victory and
he had got it. As a matter of interest it may be noted that this is
the first instance in Muslim history of a night attack-a tactical
method which did not achieve popularity until the First World
War.
Having won this round, Abu Bakr decided
to give no respite to his opponents. He would catch them before the
effect of the shock wore off and while alarm and confusion kept
them disorganised. As the sun rose, he marched to Zhu Qissa.
On arrival at Zhu Qissa, he formed up for
battle as he had done the night before, and then launched his
attack. The apostates put up a fight, but their morale was low and
after some resistance they broke contact and retreated to Abraq
where more clansmen of the Ghatfan, the Hawazin and the Tayy were
gathered. Abu Bakr, on capturing Zhu Qissa, sent a small force
under Talha bin Ubaidullah to pursue the enemy. Talha advanced a
short distance and killed some stragglers, but the small size of
his force prevented him from doing any great damage to the
retreating apostates.
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